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LAURENCE VAN LENT
Pressure and Politics in Financial Accounting
Regulation: The Case of the Financial
Conglomerates in The Netherlands
This article examines the political process of promulgating two
controversial laws which pertain to the reporting of Dutch ﬁnancial
conglomerates. Central to the study is the exploration of the lobbying
efforts observed during the process, and the interaction between the
government, the supervisors of banks and insurance companies, the
industry and its associations, and the users and auditors of annual reports
of ﬁnancial conglomerates. Previous studies in accounting-rule
development have often ignored inﬂuences that do not fall within the
formal regulatory procedures. By adopting an inductive research ap-
proach, this study explores in some detail the behaviour of participants,
including their use of informal lobbying methods. Pluralist theory is used
to explain the nature of the political process and the behaviour of
interested parties. The ﬁndings indicate that the Dutch political process in
accounting matters is indeed pluralistic. Although auditors and producers
of accounts seem to have greater possibilities to participate, the users of
corporate reports are able to effectively voice their opinion. Overall, the
users’ preferences were acknowledged in the ﬁnal rules governing the
reporting by ﬁnancial conglomerates.
Key words: Accounting; Conglomerates; Financial; Regulation.
This article reports the ﬁndings of an investigation into the ﬁnancial reporting
regulation of ﬁnancial conglomerates in the Netherlands, which was a ﬁercely
debated issue involving several government agencies and other interest groups
during 1990–4. Financial conglomerates are ﬁrms that are engaged in banking as well
as insurance activities. Among the companies were some of the most powerful ﬁrms
in the Dutch ﬁnancial market: Internationale Nederlanden Groep (ING), Rabobank
(RABO), ABN-AMRO and Fortis. The controversial accounting question that had
to be addressed when promulgating the requirements for ﬁnancial conglomerate
reporting pertained to the consolidation of the bank and insurance activities into a
single annual report. An additional question was whether additional information
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concerning the individual activities would have had to be provided if consolidation
was going to be allowed.
In this study, a detailed description of an accounting standard setting process in the
Netherlands is provided, to illustrate the typical interaction between Dutch
government and interested parties. A case study research design is then adopted to
incorporate events and lobby efforts that do not fall within the formal procedures of
the regulatory process. Extant accounting literature on lobbying has relied heavily on
observable comment letters submitted to the standard setter. However, the success of
lobbying is likely to depend on the unobservability of the lobbying agents’ activities
(Sutton, 1984). Hence, analysis of the publicly available comment letters is unlikely to
be the most effective lobbying research method (Lindahl, 1987). The Sutton–Lindahl
critique on accounting lobbying research suggests that a research design that aims at
incorporating all lobbying methods used, and thereby tries to give a full description of
the political process, is desired. Walker and Robinson (1993) argued that a case study
might buttress the understanding of the inﬂuence of interested parties on the
regulatory process and might reveal what happens behind the regulatory scenes. The
claim for case-study research is further strengthened by Amershi et al.’s (1982)
observation that lobbying is likely to be a multi-issue, multi-period process, especially
for professional lobby organizations such as industry associations or unions. To
restrict the investigation to one issue may present methodological problems because
the behaviour of certain lobbying agents can only be understood by taking a long-
term view and considering multiple issues. A case approach can address these
considerations, hence its adoption here. A few recent studies on regulatory processes
have adopted a similar strategy: Klumpes (1994), Walker and Robinson (1994a,
1994b), Rahman et al. (1994). This is the ﬁrst English-language paper known to the
author to have used a case study design to look at regulatory processes in the
Netherlands. Data for the study was collected from documents, archival records and
interviews with six key participants in the rule development process.1
The case-study report narrates in some detail the history of the promulgation of
two draft laws that laid down the reporting requirements of ﬁnancial conglomerates.
Throughout the narrative special attention should be paid to the following interested
parties: corporate managers, auditors, the Ministry of Justice, parliament, the
Council on Annual Reporting, the Dutch Central Bank (De Nederlandsche Bank),




The legislation of annual reporting is vested foremost in company law (more
speciﬁcally, in the Dutch Civil Code). It should be noted that, consciously, only the
most important aspects of annual reporting have been regulated. Firms have
considerable ﬂexibility in comprising their annual report, thus allowing them to
choose reporting methods and formats that ﬁt their needs best. Company law in the
European Community is subject to harmonization, which implies that countries in
the EC have to adjust their national rules to comply with the supranational EC
directives. For example, the fourth EC directive pertaining to annual reports of
companies stipulates requirements for the format, disclosure, and audit of the annual
report. Furthermore, the seventh EC directive is of importance. It stipulates
requirements for the consolidated annual report. Dutch company law was adjusted
to the requirements of both the fourth and seventh EC Directive in the 1980s.
Since all EC countries are subject to these directives, they are all characterized by
having annual reporting regulation vested in company law. However, there are some
differences in the degree of detail in which reporting practices have been regulated.
The U.K. and the Netherlands on the one hand allow considerable freedom. France
and Germany, most noteably, have adopted far stricter, and more detailed, rules. In
contrast to this position, it should be noted, that reporting regulation is not vested in
company law in the U.S.
The comparability of annual reports is not a governing consideration in the
regulation of Dutch ﬁnancial reporting (Zeff et al., 1992). Indeed, a different
criterion, the ‘insight requirement’, is the guiding principle. Financial statements
should furnish the insight required to enable the formation of a sound judgment as
to the company’s ﬁnancial position and the result of operations, and, to the extent
possible, should provide insight into solvency and liquidity. This insight
requirement plays an important role in the case of the ﬁnancial conglomerates, as
will be shown.
Tax Laws
Tax laws are virtually irrelevant for annual reporting in the Netherlands, a feature
which is comparable to U.S. and U.K. practice. Many other EC countries, including
France and Belgium, have closer ties between the annual reporting regulation and
tax reporting, since in these countries the annual report is used to levy corporation
taxes.
Judicial Proceedings and Jurisprudence
As a consequence of the lack of detailed prescription in Dutch annual reporting
regulation, jurisprudence is an important source of the rules governing annual
reporting, as it is in the U.K. and the U.S. The Dutch judicial proceeding is unique
owing to its Enterprise Chamber (Ondernemings-kamer), to which all interested
parties may complain if they consider corporate ﬁnancial statements do not comply
with the law (Klaassen, 1980).FIGURE 1
THE DUTCH REGULATORY FRAME WORK
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FOUNDATION TO OVERSEE listing –preparers
SECURITIES TRADING rules –auditors
Securities Committee
At the time of the research, there was no securities committee overseeing the annual
reporting of publicly owned companies. However, the ofﬁcial listing rules of the
Stock Exchange Association and the Foundation to Oversee Securities Trading
provide these monitoring bodies the opportunity to demand additional accounting
information from listed companies. This is notably different from the institutional
arrangement in the U.S., where the Securities and Exchange Committee (SEC) is
responsible for accounting rule development. In contrast to Dutch rules, the SEC
demands separate ﬁling of the required reports.
Representative Organizations
Private-sector regulation with a public-sector framework does occur. The Council on
Annual Reporting (Raad voor de Jaaverslaggeving, RJ), in which various interest
groups are represented, issues guidelines. The Council contains representatives of
preparers (employers), users (employees/unions/ﬁnancial analysts) and auditors. The
guidelines of the Council elaborate on the stipulations of the legislative framework.
The guidelines themselves do not, however, have the force of law. Efforts to promote
compliance with the private-sector guidelines are limited to conﬁdential discussions
with the auditors of companies that apparently are departing from the guidelines.
When comparing the Dutch and the Anglo-American systems, a feature to be
noted is the relatively weak enforcement status of the guidelines issued by the
ABACUS
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Council on Annual Reporting. The Accounting Standards Board in the U.K., for
example, has a similar composition and task as the Dutch Council on Annual
Reporting. However, the Dutch auditing profession did not commit itself to mention
departures from the Council’s guidelines in the audit report, while both Australian
and British audit reports require remark about non-compliance with accounting
standards. This indicates that the pronouncements of the Council on Annual
Reporting are less inﬂuential. The U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) also has considerably more power than the Dutch Council. The FASB, a
private-sector body of a similar composition to the Dutch Council, derives its
inﬂuence largely from the SEC which enforces the application of the accounting
standards the FASB proclaims. Moreover, U.S. auditors will issue qualiﬁed or
adverse opinions if a company’s annual reports diverge from GAAP.
Regulatory Arrangements Regarding Financial Institutions
Finally, a further point of introduction is provided regarding the institutional and
regulatory arrangements that were faced by ﬁnancial conglomerates. Dutch banks
and insurance ﬁrms are monitored by the Central Bank and Verzekeringskamer
(Insurance Chamber), respectively. The Dutch Central Bank, which has consid-
erable power in setting the country’s monetary policy, is an independent non-
governmental institution. Apart from its tasks in setting the monetary policy, it also is
required by law to ensure the stability and ‘healthiness’ of the Dutch ﬁnancial
system. The Insurance Chamber is a similarly non-governmental monitoring agency,
which oversees the insurance industry, and has extensive authority to achieve this.
The Dutch Central Bank was committed to a ‘general separation’ policy in which
banks and insurance companies were not allowed to merge. This policy was designed
to facilitate sound banking practices and to enhance healthy competition in the
industry. However, from 1 January 1990 this general separation was abolished.
Subsequently, a wave of takeovers took place in the Dutch ﬁnancial market. In
parallel was the implementation of two EC directives covering the annual reports of
banks and insurance companies. Apparently establishment of ﬁnancial conglom-
erates was not anticipated when the EC directives were drafted, as there were no
references in the directives to the annual reports of these conglomerates. The
national legislature now had the opportunity to stipulate reporting requirements for
these ﬁrms. Financial conglomerates are subjected neither to the legislation of banks
nor to the legislation of insurance ﬁrms (Explanatory Memorandum, Memorie van
Toelichting, 22169 A:1). Since there are no special rules in the Civil Code that apply
to ﬁnancial conglomerates, these companies are simply subjected to the fourth and
seventh EC Directive, and the general requirements of the Dutch Civil Code. One
such general requirement of the code deals with the obligation to consolidate the
ﬁnancial statements of all subsidiaries in a group and of all group members (Article
406, para. 1). The exception to this rule, however, is when consolidation violates the
insight required to enable the formation of a sound judgment as to the company’s
ﬁnancial position. Then, consolidation might be prevented, and the annual report of
such a group member needs to be disclosed in the notes on the ﬁnancial statement of
the group (separate reporting). Potential violations of this ‘insight requirement’ areABACUS
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caused by differences in activities between the group member and the group (Article
406, para. 3). In the legal literature pertaining to para. 3 of Article 406, the case of
banks and insurance companies is explicitly mentioned as an example in which
differences in activities may prevent consolidation (see, Burgert et al., 1990, p. 596;
Proceedings, Second Chamber, 19813, no. 3). Two technical accounting questions
were raised in the promulgation process of the reporting rules governing ﬁnancial
conglomerates, namely, whether these companies should consolidate both banking
and insurance activities. And furthermore, in case consolidation was allowed,
whether anything would have to be done about the reduction of information
concerning the individual activities.
THE CASE: FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES IN THE NETHERLANDS
The case-study report comprises two distinct parts of the legistrative process affecting
ﬁnancial conglomerates—(a) the banking directive and (b) the insurance directive.
The ﬁrst two sections narrate the events of the regulatory process of ﬁnancial
conglomerate reporting. The following section discusses some possible explanations
of the case ﬁndings based upon pluralist theory. These sections are followed by a brief
outline of the ﬁndings of pluralist theory. Table 1 sets out a chronology of main events.
The Legislative Process, Part 1: The Incorporation of the Banking Directive
In the background section of this paper, it was stated that Dutch ﬁnancial reported
regulation encompasses the effects of the fourth and seventh EC directives. Article 1
para. 2 of the fourth directive (PbEG L222, 14 August 1978) stipulates that members
of the EC are not compelled to subject banks, other ﬁnancial instructions, and
insurance companies to the requirments of the directive.3 Despite this option in the
EC directive, banks and insurance companies were not excluded from its operating
range when both directives were incorperated into Dutch companies law.
On 8 December 1986 the council of the European Community accepted the
proposed directive on annual reporting by banks (hereafter, the banking directive;
PbEG L372, 31 December 1986). It is interesting to note that the Central Bank was
the spokesman for the Dutch delegation at the EC’s meetings regarding the banking
directive.4 The Central Bank carried the point that consolidation of bank and
insurance activities should not be allowed, which was also the general opinion in the
EC (Memorie van Toelichting, 22169 A: 1). It should be noted that this issue was
barely even a point of discussion at the EC meetings on the banking Directive. The
Central Bank held that it was appropriate to allow only limited ﬂexibility in
reporting practices within a particular industry. Consequently, the Central Bank
stressed the comparability argument for reports of ﬁrms within an industry. Thus, in
the EC discussion the Central Bank agreed with the communis opinio that insurance
3 The exemption of banks and insurance companies from the fourth Directive was temporary. Pending
further coordination of these companies, the fourth Directive was not necessarily applicable to them.
4 The reason for this was that ﬁnancial reporting by banks is a responsibility of the Ministry of





1978 Fourth directive annual reports EC
March 1981 Draft EC bank directive
April 1984 Second draft EC bank directive
1984 Seventh directive annual reports EC: consolidation
1985 Revision draft directive coordination banks
8 December 1986 Approval bank directive by European Council of Ministers
1 January 1990 General separation of banks and insurance companies comes to an end
27 June 1991 Draft law 22169 and Explanatory Memorandum to Second Chamber
19 December 1991 Approval insurance directive by European Council of Ministers
31 January 1992 Publication of joint NVB/VvV advisory paper
25  March  1992 MEY announces its preference for separate reporting by ﬁnancial
conglomerates
2 April 1992 Provisional report 22169 Second Chamber
11  May  1992 Memorandum of Reply 22169 Second Chamber and Memorandum of
Alterations 22169
8 July 1992 Final report 22169 Second Chamber
17 July 1992 Memorandum on account of Final report 22169 and Second Memorandum
of Alterations 22169
July 1992 Justice minister requests advice of Council on Annual Reporting regarding
22169
30 September 1992 Third Memorandum of Alterations
5 November 1992 Draft law 22896 and Explanatory Memorandum to Second Chamber
10 November 1992 Plenary discussion in Second Chamber of 22169
19 November 1992 Draft law 22169 to First Chamber
29 January 1993 Report 22896 Second Chamber
2 February 1993 Provisional report 22169 First Chamber
3 February 1993 Memorandum of Reply 22169 First Chamber
24 February 1993 Memorandum to Report 22896 Second Chamber
April 1993 Conversation between Mr Vreugdenhil and Mr Badon Ghijben (ING)
17 May 1993 Report on written deliberations 22896 Second Chamber
27 May 1993 Publication in Staatsblad 1993-258 of Law 22169
24 June 1993 Amendments Vreugdenhil/Vermeend to 22896
28 June 1993 Second Memorandum of Alterations 22896
1 July 1993 Plenary discussion of 22896 in Second Chamber
12 July 1993 Draft law 22896 and Explanatory Memorandum to First Chamber
31 August 1993 Report 22896 First Chamber
14 September 1993 Plenary discussion 22896 in First Chamber
14 October 1993 Publication in Staatblad 1993-517 of Law 22896
Source: Kamerstukken and Handelingen (see references), NVB/VvV (1992) and FD (25 March 1992).ABACUS
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and bank activities could not be consolidated. It should be noted that the Central
Bank also had not foreseen, at the time of the EC meetings, that ﬁnancial
conglomerates were to become an issue.
Later in the process, after a number of major ﬁnancial companies had formed into
conglomerates and the banking directive was transformed into a draft law by the
Dutch Justice Ministry, the Central Bank lifted its objections to the consolidation issue.
Pressure rose towards the Central Bank to be more lenient regarding consolidated
reporting by ﬁnancial conglomerates. As a supervisory agent, the Central Bank had
more important issues to consider than reporting requirements. To disturb the delicate
relationship between the Central Bank and the Dutch ﬁnancial institutions over this
minor point seemed futile (interview with Ms Wortmann). Also, there was some
understanding within the Central Bank that the new ﬁnancial institutions would like to
show their over-all ﬁnancial strength. However, since the ﬁnancial conglomerates were
likely to have an important impact on the public, they would have to disclose sufﬁcient
information, including separate reports on both the banking and insurance segments.
In addition to the Central Bank’s wish for separate reporting, there was another point
that should be taken into consideration. The Central Bank strives for congruity
between the annual reports of banks and the maandstaten, monthly reports, which
banks have to submit to the Central Bank. This congruity implies that ﬁnancial
institutions incur fewer costs in complying with reporting requirements (interview with
Mr Boezer).5 One could also contend that the Central Bank had an interest in
controlling the knowledge gap between the general public as a user of annual reports
and itself, for it has additional information from the monthly reports. Should this gap
become too wide, the general public could point to the Central Bank in the case of a
bank failure, accusing it of adequate supervision and of failure to inform the public in
time. However, if the gap is narrow, such accusations will have less effect. Conse-
quently, the Central Bank favoured adequate disclosure by ﬁnancial institutions.
Thus, although the Central Bank relented on the consolidation issue, it
maintained its position that additional separate information would have to be
provided. Moreover, the Central Bank advised against laying down any further
requirements in law until the EC had formulated its own requirements. The Justice
Ministry did not consider this advice to be in the interest of ﬁnancial conglomerates,
since such EC requirements would probably take a great deal of time to formulate
and the outcome of the EC regulatory processes is not readily predictable (interview
with Ms Wortmann). Therefore, it strived to have the whole matter prescribed in law,
before the EC formulated its own requirements.
The opinions and actions of the Central Bank are important, not only because it
supervises ﬁnancial conglomerates and has substantial power in the Dutch ﬁnancial
market, but also because, in the initial draft law, it was given substantial authority in
setting reporting requirements for banks. The Second Chamber,6 however, opposed
5 Mr Boezer did not agree with Ms Wortmann’s opinion that the DNB made a trade-off on the issues
of reporting and supervisory tasks. He made the point that the DNB deals with these issues
separately with ﬁnancial institutions.
6 Parliament consists of two chambers, of which the Second Chamber is the politically more important.FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING REGULATION IN THE NETHERLANDS
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the delegation of rule-making power to a ‘private’ institution such as the Central
Bank. This was a surprise to the Central Bank, since it was not informed by the
Justice Ministry of the pending rejection by the Chamber of the proposed draft
(interview with Mr Boezer). It is likely that this experience inﬂuenced the further
involvement of Central Bank on this issue. In particular, it should be considered that
the spokesman of the then largest political party (Christian Democrats [CDA]) in
the Second Chamber had received inside information from the banking industry
stating they objected to a more pronounced role for the Central Bank in the standard
setting process (interview with Mr Vreugdenhil). According to the Central Bank,
reporting requirements were issued in order to comply with an explicit request made
by the banks. This reveals a conﬂict between the ofﬁcial statements of banks
regarding the Central Bank’s standard setting efforts and their ‘hidden agenda’. As
the Christian Democrats’ spokesman pointed out, part of this conﬂict can be
explained by the power the Central Bank embodies in the Dutch ﬁnancial system.
The banks may have feared that their position vis a vis the Central Bank would
deteriorate by increasing the Central Bank’s tasks further.
The banking directive should have been incorporated into national law on 31
December 1990. However, the rewriting of the directive into a draft law took until
June 1991 owing, in the explanation of the ministers of Justice and Finance, to the
complexity of the matter and the intensive deliberations with the parties involved
(Explanatory Memorandum, 22169, no. 3, p. 3).7 According to the Justice Ministry, it
is policy to encourage involvement by the companies which a draft law will affect if
the proposed legislation deals with highly complex and technical matters such as
ﬁnancial reporting. Indeed, the ministry took the initiative to contact inter alia
AMEV, one of the constituting companies of Fortis to discuss reporting by ﬁnancial
conglomerates. In their Explanatory Memorandum, the ministers stated that further
study was necessary with regard to the consolidation of banks and insurance
companies which are members of the same group. This is because it was not foreseen
on completing the banking directive that banks and insurance companies would be
able to form ﬁnancial conglomerates. Therefore, it had not been foreseen that
consolidation of both activities would become an issue. No rules were laid down
pertaining to organizations with equally important banking and insurance activities.
The ministers also planned to take the forthcoming insurance directive into account
when formulating, at a later stage, their views on the consolidation of activities
within a ﬁnancial conglomerate.
Despite these qualiﬁcations, the ministers voiced some preliminary opinions which
were also part of the Explanatory Memorandum. The ministers argued that
consolidation should not be too readily judged as conﬂicting with the insight
requirement. In their opinion, the only rules which applied to the ﬁnancial
7 When a minister submits a draft law to parliament, he adds an Explanatory Memorandum which
contains the history of the draft, the advice offered by representative organizations and an
explanation of the purpose and content of the law. The number after ‘Explanatory Memorandum’
refers to the number of the draft law involved, in this case, 22169. The following number, preceded
by the abbreviation ‘no.’ refers to the number of the document pertaining to a draft law, in this case,
document 3 which is the Explanatory Memorandum.ABACUS
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conglomerates with equal shares of banking and insurance activities were those
formulated in the fourth and seventh EC directives. The ministers announced that a
workgroup had been formed, consisting of industry members, which was to offer
advice on the reporting requirements of ﬁnancial conglomerates.
Contiguously, the Council of the European Community accepted the directive on
(consolidated) annual reporting by insurance companies (hereafter, the insurance
directive) on 19 December 1991 (PbEG L374, 31 December 1991). During the
formulation of this insurance directive, the insurance industry maintained intensive
contacts with the Dutch Justice Ministry. These contacts were used later by the
Ministry to discuss the reporting requirements of ﬁnancial conglomerates with
industry members. In particular, the contacts with Nationale Nederlanden, one of the
constituting companies of ING, proved important when the Ministry formulated its
opinion on the reporting issue (interview with Mr Badon Gijben and Mr Kuijper).
On 31 January 1992, the joint workgroup of industry members, representing both
the Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken (Dutch Association of Banks [NVB] and the
Verbond van verzekeraars (Alliance of Insurance Companies [VvV] presents its
advisory paper, Verslaggeving ﬁnanciele concerns (Financial Conglomerate
Reporting). Two items were of importance to the current study, namely the proposals
on consolidation and segmentation. First, the principal argument of the NVB/VvV
workgroup was that ﬁnancial conglomerates had to and wished to present themselves
as single units (NVB/VvV, 1992, p. 2). It was, therefore, not desirable to require
separate reporting by the subsidiaries. The wish to be seen as one indivisible unit was
also taken emphatically by ING mainly for strategic reasons. In the NVB/VvV
proposal on segment reporting, the workgroup stated that more detail should be
provided in the notes to the consolidated balance sheet and proﬁt and loss statement
to satisfy the insight requirement and also to comply with the requirements of the
banking and insurance directives. Insight into segment (activity) would have to be
given by splitting the consolidated data up to the level of earnings before taxes.
However, there should be no division of shareholder equity between the segments.
Such a division was argued not to be in agreement with the bedrijfseconomische
(business economic) characteristics of consolidated reporting. In the opinion of ING,
these business economic problems arise because group equity is the only important
ﬁgure for shareholders of the group. Shareholders should not be concerned with the
allocation of equity over the activities. Re-allocation of shareholder equity between
the banking or insurance part of the company does not necessarily have to have
special consequences, since this was said to be a fairly arbitrary matter. Importantly, it
was recognised that clients of a particular bank or insurance company within the
group should refer to the annual reports of that bank or insurance company to be
assured of its solvency. Moreover, in the segmentation of group equity, units which are
legally part of the insurance company could be allocated to the bank activities
because of their speciﬁc character. However, this does not imply that the liabilities of
these units are guaranteed by the equity of the bank (interview with Mr Badon
Ghijben and Mr Kuijper). This statement by ING requires some qualiﬁcation. By the
time of the publication of the ING 1991 annual report, it was not clear whether
separate reports would be issued by the NMB-Postbank or other subsidiaries of ING.FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING REGULATION IN THE NETHERLANDS
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Indeed, spokesmen at ING at the time of publication contradicted each other on this
matter (FD, 2 May 1992). Consequently, ING’s comment on the business-economic
argument is not valid, as this argument was used in 1991, at which time ING did not
know whether it was going to publish separate reports on the subsidiaries.
The workgroup presented a model for ﬁnancial conglomerate reporting. This
model was new. In the discussion of the reaction of the companies involved, it will be
analyzed which companies reﬂected this model in their annual report. It is important
to note that the Justice Ministry initiated and stimulated the joint NVB/VvV
advisory activities, and agreed with its general terms. During the writing process,
there was contact between the Justice Ministry and the workgroup. However, within
the Justice Ministry it was felt that there was some disagreement between the
members of the workgroup on the segmentation issue, in particular between Fortis
and ING. Therefore, the Justice Ministry began to formulate some stipulations
regarding this segmentation issue before the paper was published. It was in the
interest of the Ministry of Justice and the industry to have a shared line of conduct in
ﬁnancial reporting. If controversies on the reporting issue led to completely
incomparable annual reports, the EC would have more reason to speed up its
regulatory process and impose a standard. Moreover, a shared line of conduct would
make a favourable outcome of parliamentary deliberations more likely.
Parliament, that is, the Second Chamber waited until the publication of the
industry advisory paper before starting is ‘preparatory investigation’ of the draft law
in a legislative committee in the ﬁrst quarter of 1992. In their Provisional Report, the
members of the Christian Democratic Party stated that they were somewhat
disappointed by the industry advice, which they considered a compromise. The
Christian Democrats implied that there surely must have been signiﬁcant controversy
on this issue between the members of the workgroup. Log-rolling had probably taken
place, leading to ING’s opinion being given priority on this issue. Consequently, the
advice was not considered very important by the Christian Democrats (interview with
Mr Vreugdenhil). In the Christian Democrats’ opinion, one of the driving forces
behind the banking directive was the comparability concept. Leaving out the
segmentation of group equity as irrelevant was typical of the lack of comparability
between ﬁnancial conglomerates, banks and insurance companies that would result
from implementing this advice. The Christian Democrats’ demand was that separate
consolidated annual reports of both the banking and insurance groups would be
provided in addition to the over-all annual report of the conglomerate (Provisional
Report, 22169, no. 4, pp. 1–2). Notable was the Christian Democrats’ stress on the
comparability argument, which conﬂicts with the leading principle of Dutch ﬁnancial
reporting regulation, ‘insight’. However, the Christian Democrats’ seemed to attach a
great deal of value to the interests of investors, which would allegedly be served by
comparability. Indeed, a large investment ﬁrm called the Christian Democrats’
attention to the need for the comparability of annual reports. Although their
spokesman on the issue visited several ﬁnancial conglomerates,8 it was the investor’s
interests which appear to have had the most inﬂuence.
8 Vreugdenhil visited ABN-AMRO, ING, RABO, and Credit Lyonnaise Bank Nederland.ABACUS
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At this stage of the regulatory process, only the Christian Democrats made
remarks regarding ﬁnancial conglomerates. The ministers answered the legislative
committee in a Memorandum of Reply (22169, no. 5, pp. 2–3). They again expressed
their opinion that ﬁnancial conglomerate reporting was not subject to the rules
pertaining to banks or insurance companies. In the present situation, without the
example of existing rules abroad or in the Netherlands, the initiative of the
NVB/VvV should be appreciated as a ﬁrst attempt to map out the problems and
furnish some solutions. With regard to the irrelevance of the segmentation of equity,
the ministers stated that the existence of ﬁnancial conglomerates was a relatively
new development. The special characteristics of ﬁnancial conglomerates, that is, the
entanglement of both banking and insurance activities, would have to be expressed
in their annual report. In particular, the consolidated annual report of the whole
economic entity, the ﬁnancial conglomerate, was viewed as the vital element. In view
of the special properties of banks and insurance companies and their prominent
position in society, ﬁnancial conglomerates cannot sufﬁce with this consolidated
information. Owing to the separation of banks and insurance ﬁrms in the past it is
possible, at present, to provide information about the separate activities. The ques-
tion, according to the ministers, is in which fashion the additional information should
be offered and which level of insight is sufﬁcient. The ministers suggested that insight
should be offered into both activities in accordance with the two directives. This
proposal was formalized in a Memorandum of Alterations (Nota van wijziging,
22169, no. 6, p. 1) pertaining to Article 406, to which three new paragraphs were
added of which paras 4 and 5 are relevant to the issue at hand. The ministers argued
that their proposal was in line with the NVB/VvV advice. It should be noted that the
Minister of Justice initially did not intend to set down these requirements in law. The
initial plan was to let the NVB/VvV suggestions be the (informal) standard, without
any legislative backing. However, the new paragraphs of Article 406 were implemen-
ted owing to political pressures (Christian Democrats) and the explicit wish of the
Central Bank for legislative requirements on this issue (interview with Ms Wortmann
and Mr Boezer).9 In hindsight, both the Ministry of Justice and ING, as a major
contributor to the NVB/VvV advisory paper, concluded that the advice was of little
relevance to the resulting regulation, in contrast to ex-ante expectations. One of the
most important statements in their Memorandum of Reply was that the ministers did
not wish to commit themselves to the method by which insight in both activities
would be provided. They insisted that there would be an ongoing entanglement of
both activities. The requirement of separate consolidated annual reports could lead,
in time, to statements which did not offer a reliable picture of the ﬁnancial situation
per segment, owing to the large number of arbitrary allocations and the dissection of
what is, in fact, an indivisible economic entity. However, if ﬁnancial conglomerates
felt that the insight demanded was best provided by separate annual reports, they
would be permitted to issue such reports.
9 The DNB did not only favour legal reporting requirements, it also preferred limiting the reporting
options. Limiting freedom in reporting would facilitate comparability, one of the prime goals of the
DNB.FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING REGULATION IN THE NETHERLANDS
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In summary, the increasing possibility of distinguishing between banking and
insurance products and activities had led the ministers to propose that insight, as a
general and broad requirement, should be provided into the entity as well as both
separate activities. Managerial discretion would determine the most adequate
accounting method of offering such insight. This ministerial proposal was in line with
the joint-industry advice. At this stage of the policy process, there was consensus
concerning the consolidation of banking and insurance activities into one annual
report. Differences of opinion between the ministers and industry on the one hand,
and the Christian Democrats and Central Bank on the other, existed on the
segmentation issue, and more speciﬁcally on the subject of the accounting format by
which insight into the discerned activities should be offered.
The ﬁnal report of the legislative committee emphasized this difference of
opinion. The Christian Democrats’ reaction to the ministers’ Memorandum of Reply
was that, although the entanglement of banking and insurance activities might
theoretically prevent the adequate separation of both activities in separate reports,
in practice, the management of ﬁnancial conglomerates would still want to know
whether a certain activity is proﬁtable or efﬁcient. In other words, it was unlikely that
the separation of both activities would prove to be impossible, owing to the need for
managerial control within the company. The Christian Democrats also mentioned
the position of the supervising institutions: the Central Bank and the Insurance
Chamber. The supervisors would also require segmented equity information. The
Christian Democrats argued that the ministers’ noncommittal position to the
accounting method in which insight in both activities should be provided, conﬂicted
with the EC directive and with the proposed changes of Article 406 which, from this
perspective, implied that disclosure of the equity of the banking segment was neces-
sary. Interestingly, the Christian Democrats referred to the Fortis annual report as an
example of the possibility of disclosing the banking segment’s equity. The Fortis
report convinced the Christian Democrats that it was possible to provide insight into
both activities separately (interview with Mr Vreugdenhil). ING likewise contended
that there were only a few technical obstacles to separate reporting (interview with
Mr Badon Ghijben and Mr Kuijper). Thus, although the ministers stressed the
accounting problems involved with separate reporting, the companies involved
readily admitted that these problems were not the major issue.
The ministers subsequently responded to the ﬁnal report in a Memorandum (Nota
naar aanleiding van het Eindverslag, 22169, no. 8). They stated that, in their opinion,
it was not possible to act in conﬂict with the EC directives since neither the banking
nor the insurance directive made any provisions regarding ﬁnancial conglomerates.
The ministers argued, furthermore, that although it was uncertain whether banking
and insurance activities would become so entwined that reporting on separate
activities would become arbitrary, both management and supervising institutions
would have sufﬁcient instruments for obtaining the necessary insight into the
ﬁnancial condition.10 Moreover, the ministers agreed with the Christian Democrats’
10 The Justice Ministry itself regarded the entanglement argument as weak. Nonetheless, it was
considered convenient in parliamentary discussions.ABACUS
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view that, as a result of Article 406, paras 4 and 5, would be that the equity of both
banking and insurance activities would have to be disclosed in some fashion in the
segmentation. Furthermore, the ministers announced that the Council on Annual
Reporting was going to be consulted regarding the way in which insight should be
provided (i.e., the concrete elaboration of paras 4 and 5 of Article 406).11 This
request for advice was a diversionary manoeuvre, the intention of which was to get
the proposed Article 406 implemented without further changes (interview with Ms
Wortmann). It should be noted that Article 406 retained considerable reporting
ﬂexibility to the ﬁnancial conglomerates. Indeed, it was formulated in such a way
that it suited both ING and Fortis, the parties which had the most divergent
opinions.
This reply by the ministers formed the somewhat sudden (provisional) end to the
problem. The proposed Article 406 was enacted without further changes and the
matter was no longer a point of discussion on the ﬂoor of the Second Chamber
(Proceedings, Handelingen, TK 20-1481). The First Chamber likewise had no
comments on the issue of ﬁnancial conglomerates.
The Legislative Process, Part 2: The Incorporation of the Insurance Directive
This was not the end of the story. On 19 December 1991, the Council of the
European Community accepted the proposed Directive regarding the (consolidated)
annual reports of insurance companies (PbEG L374 31 December 1991). The draft
law to incorporate the Directive into the Dutch Civil Code was submitted to
parliament on 5 November 1992. In the Explanatory Memorandum (22896, no. 3, p.
23) the ministers stated that ﬁnancial conglomerates should report in accordance
with paras 4 and 5 of Article 406. In its report (Report, 22896, no. 5, p. 1), the
Christian Democrats at the legislative committee once again stressed the
comparability issue. Moreover, the Christian Democrats favoured an organizational
structure for ﬁnancial conglomerates with a topholding and two subholdings which
supervised the banking and insurance activities, respectively. All three holdings
should disclose a consolidated annual report, and in this fashion the ﬁnancial
position of the whole conglomerate, as well as its constituting parts, would become
visible. The Christian Democrats indicated that they were willing to lay down such a
structure in law. The idea behind this proposal was that this type of organizational
structure would enhance investors’ ability to form sound judgements on corporate
ﬁnancial affairs. Moreover, the supervising institutions would be provided with a
clear distinction between banks and insurance companies (interview with Mr
Vreugdenhil). The Labour Party (PydA) (Report, 22896, no. 5, p. 2) joined the
Christian Democrats in their opinion that insight into ﬁnancial conglomerates should
be enlarged by setting requirements on the disclosure of banking and insurance
activities.
11 The Council on Annual Reporting subsequently established a workgroup, whose members were Mr
J. van der Plas (Moret, Ernst & Young, auditor of ING), Mr J. Buitendijk (ING), A. F. M. van Klaren
(CNV/FNV—union), Mr O. L. A. M. Spaan (ABN/AMRO), Mr M. H. Th. Steunebrink (NIVRA—
auditor), Professor F. van der Wel (Touche Ross Nederland/academic) (RJ, 1993:4).FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING REGULATION IN THE NETHERLANDS
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The minister replied (Memorandum to Report, 22896, no. 6, p. 2) that, in
accordance with Article 406, ﬁnancial conglomerates would already have to disclose
in their notes on the consolidated annual report, behoorlijk wat, that is, substantial
information pertaining to the separate activities. These stipulations had been
incorporated into the law because it was feared that, without such requirements, a
top holding company could disclose just one consolidated annual report without
providing any insight into the separate activities.
Apparently, the committee’s Christian Democrat members were not satisﬁed with
this solution. They did not consider the disclosure of substantial amount of data in the
notes on the consolidation of the top-holding to be sufﬁcient. They once again
proposed two additional consolidated annual reports, one for each activity (Verslag
van een schriftelijk overleg, Report on written deliberations, 22896, no. 8, p. 2). In his
reply, the minister maintained that although Article 406 allowed consolidation,
separate information about bank and insurance activities was required, in accordance
with the EC directives regarding both activities. This answer was still not satisfactory
to the Labour and Christian Democrat Parties, and the MPS Mr Vreugdenhil (CDA)
and Mr Vermeend (PvdA) submitted an amendment to Article 406 in which the
separate reporting on banking and insurance activities was speciﬁed. Formally, a new
para. 6 was added to Article 406, which demanded the separation of balance sheet
information, in accordance with the format requirements of the EC directives. The
separation would have to include the equity of the separate bank and insurance
activities. Through this amendment, the indecision of the ministers regarding the
accounting method in which insight should be given was put aside. Instead of the
relative ﬂexibility in accounting method choice that the ministers (and industry)
advocated, the framework and requirements of both EC directives were imposed.
The draft law was subsequently accepted by parliament. The First Chamber did not
comment on the proposal. One question that remains to be answered is: what
triggered Mr Vreugdenhil and Mr Vermeend’s amendment in which the choice of
format was speciﬁed based on insight, including the requirement pertaining to the
segmentation of shareholder equity. Two factors seem to have been inﬂuential. A high
ranking ﬁnancial ofﬁcer at ING voiced the opinion in a conversation with the
Christian Democrats’ spokesman that Article 406 did not compel ﬁnancial
conglomerates to report separately on banking and insurance activities in accordance
with the format requirements of the EC directive, nor did it compel these companies
to segment shareholder equity. In fact, the 1992 ING annual report did not disclose
segmental information about shareholder equity. Second, the minister announced in
the parliamentary treatment of the bank draft, that he would consult the Council on
Annual Reporting on the matter of the application of Article 406 in the case of annual
reporting by ﬁnancial conglomerates. A source from within the Council entrusted to
the Christian Democrats’ spokesman that the Council was unable to reach an
agreement. The Council’s workgroup advised that the disclosure of segmentation
information on shareholder equity, in line with ING’s position (interview with Mr
Badon Ghijben and Mr Kuijper). The advice of the Council’s workgroup met with
resistance within the Council. In particular, the auditors’ and users’ delegation
objected to the implications of the advice. They were in favour of disclosure. TheABACUS
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Christian Democrats concluded that ING was again the obstructing party in the failure
to reach an agreement.12 According to the Christian Democrats, ING had consider-
able inﬂuence on the employers’ delegation in the Council on Annual Reporting, as it
was a large contributor to the funds of the Employers Association, the Federation of
Dutch Industries (VNO). In conclusion, the obstruction of the implementation of
Article 406 by ING led to the Vreugdenhil/ Vermeend-amendment.
Why was ING the foremost opponent to the requirements of (the draft) law? The
CDA felt that of the companies constituting ING, NMB-Postbank and Nationale
Nederlanden, it was the former which had the weaker shareholder equity position
(interview with Mr Vreugdenhil).13 In the merger process, signiﬁcant transfers of
equity funds had taken place to strengthen the NMB-Postbank’s equity position.
NMB-Postbank itself was established as a result of a merger between NMB and
Postbank. It was NMB which had previously committed itself to an aggressive
market policy which inherently entailed high risk. This high risk had had its effects
on NMB’s shareholder equity. Table 2 provides the reported equity of ING and
NMB-Postbank in the relevant years. ING denied that equity transfers were the
reason for their rejection of separate reporting. Instead, they stated that they had
wished to present themselves as a single indivisible unit. This wish had a strategic
origin. Some (ﬁnancial) analysts had doubted the feasibility of ﬁnancial con-
glomerates (Borkema et al., 1992; Keiser, 1993; FD, 6-08-1993). ING, therefore, did
not wish to emphasize that it was the result of a merger between two ﬁelds which
were previously thought to be impossible to unite. In a way, separate reporting
would signal to investors that the critics were right and that even ING was not
certain of its own success (interview with Mr Badon Ghijben and Mr Kuijper).
While ING did not favour the segmentation proposal, in the end it acknowledged
that it was very likely that this proposal would become law. At that time, ING
changed its strategy. As was noted before, ING’s ﬁnancial ofﬁcer had a conversation
with the Christian Democrats spokesman in April 1993. In this discussion, ING tried
12 Another high-ranking INH ofﬁcer, Mr J. Buitendijk, was a member of the workgroup which
prepared the advisory paper.
13 Mr Vreugdenhil based this observation on information that was conveyed to him by an employee of
ING.
TABLE 2
CONSOLIDATED EQUITY DEVELOPMENT: ING GROUP AND NMB-POSTBANK
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
ING Group 14,150* 13,874* 13,859 15,597 21,481
NMB-Postbank 4,944 5,346 5,902
Source: Annual Reports of ING-Group (1992) and NMB-Postbank (1990 and 1991). *pro forma
combined amounts according to ING-Group annual report 1992FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING REGULATION IN THE NETHERLANDS
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to convince the Christian Democrats that segmentation of shareholder equity would
not provide useful information to the users. When this argument failed, ING put
forward another aspect of the insurance draft which was considered undesirable by
the insurance industry. Under the draft law (22896), real estate which was used by
the company itself had to be depreciated (Explanatory Memorandum, 22896, nos
1–2, p. 9). Although there had been intensive discussions between the Justice
Ministry and industry on this point, the ministry had not given in. In a letter to the
Chamber’s legislative committee, the Verbond van Verzekeraars had already asked
the committee to amend this point. ING now suggested to the Christian Democrats
spokesman amending the draft in accordance with the wishes of industry. This could
be viewed as a trade-off on the segmentation and the depreciation issues (interview
with Mr Badon Ghijben and Mr Vreugdenhil).
A Brief Note on the Explanatory Framework: Pluralism
The detailed description of the behaviour of the participants and the events of the
regulatory process enables an attempt to explain the empirical ﬁndings. It should be
noted that the exploration of the case was conducted independently from the
explanatory effort. Essentially, then, pluralism presents a view of the political process
in which power is fragmented and diffused, although some individuals or groups
have more power than others. The outcome of the political process is said to be
dependent on the relative strength of the interest groups involved (Dahl, 1961;
Hirschleifer, 1976; Becker, 1983). Sources of power are distributed non-cumulatively,
and no one source is dominant (Ham and Hill, 1988). Dahl (1957) argued that the
behaviour of agents pursuing different preferences in concrete decisions should be
studied to describe the relative inﬂuence of interested parties. The pluralist tenet
underlies the economic literature of the political process, more commonly known as
public-choice theory (Mueller, 1989). Many researchers in accounting have adopted
economic theories of regulation (Puro, 1984), or of democracy of Downs (1957) and
Olson (1965) (Sutton, 1984; Lindahl, 1987), or of the ﬁrm (Watts and Zimmerman,
1978; Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; Kelly, 1983). In this line of work the incentives
and preferences of interested parties are outlined and an equilibrium prediction is
generated based upon the resources agents commit to their purpose. Government is
seen as an interest group itself, the political process is depicted as a marketplace in
which politicians compete for votes (Downs, 1967). Regulations are demanded and
supplied (by government) in order to fulﬁl the self-interest of the actors in the
process (Peltzman, 1976; Mccormick and Tollison, 1981; Tollison, 1982). Accounting
standards can thus be seen as products of a process in which regulations are set on
the strength of the demands of effectively participating interest groups to fulﬁl the
needs of the standard-setters (Rahman et al., 1994). Regulation implies that certain
agents are restricted in their implementation of ex-ante plans; therefore, regulation
results in wealth transfers (McCormick and Tollison, 1981). Choosing between two
alternative reporting requirements, then, is similar to the choice between two wealth
distributions (May and Sundem, 1976; Bryant and Thornton, 1983). Since agents are
affected in their wealth by regulation, they have an interest in the regulatory process.
In public choice theory, all agents are potential wealth suppliers as well as deman-ABACUS
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ders. Attempts by agents to induce government to grant favours are costly (Tollison,
1982). If agents consider the costs of individual campaigning too high, they may
combine their interests and undertake collective action. Then, organization costs will
be incurred (Ohlson, 1965). Finally, the costs of employing a certain lobby instru-
ment must be considered (Berry, 1977). In public choice theory, lobbying is, in the
end, a cost/beneﬁt trade-off. The entrance of an issue in the political process is often
the result of a perceived crisis (Watts, 1977). Nobes (1991) argued that a wave of
takeovers can provide the energy to start a regulatory process.
Pluralism has been criticized on two levels. First, political scientists have argued
that power can be used to limit the scope of actual decision making to ‘safe’ issues. In
such a fashion, the emergence of new demands for regulation is deterred. The analysis
of decision making is then biased since it only incorporates (overt) inﬂuence attempts
in innocuous issues, instead of the covert conﬂict in shaping the political agenda
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). Moreover, Lukes (1974) argued that there is a third
dimension of power, latent conﬂict, in which power is used to shape people’s prefer-
ences so that no conﬂicts at all arise. Second, pluralism has been attacked because its
assumptions might not be consistent with the political processes in the development
of accounting standards (Walker and Robinson, 1993). Regulatory arrangements in
accounting often involve complex and dynamic interactions between agencies. Plura-
lism does not explicitly address the intricacies of interorganizational relationships.
With regard to the political science critique on pluralism it should be noted that
examining covert and latent conﬂict encounters ample empirical problems. Even the
study of decision making in a pluralist context is often incomplete for the very reason
that lobby success depends on secrecy. However, the case study design allows the
collection of evidence of possible power exertion beyond that in overt decision
making. Thus, although pluralist theory may not be able to explain this phenom-
enon, the research design that was adopted facilitated the collection of data that
indicate whether there is evidence of covert or latent conﬂict. Whether the pluralist
notion is applicable to explain political processes in accounting is an empirical
question which is addressed in the discussion sections below.
Discussion of Field Reactions: The Position and Lobby Efforts of Users
Most users did not lobby intensively. User involvement in the formal regulatory
process was largely restricted to participation in the Council on Annual Reporting.
This is not unexpected since there is prior empirical evidence of the lack of user
involvement in regulatory processes (e.g., Nobes, 1992). Moreover, lobbying is costly,
and lobby efforts are said to be dependent on the resources at an agent’s disposal
(Blake, 1973; Becker, 1983). It should be remembered that the pluralist’s notion of
political processes asserts that resources are widely bu unequally distributed, and
consequently lobbying will be undertaken by certain groups only. Users, arguably, are
not the wealthiest group. In this case, two user groups, however, did have substantial
resources. First, the large investment ﬁrm that called the Christian Democrats’
attention to the position of the users of ﬁnancial conglomerates’ reports. And second,
the ﬁnancial press, that is, FEM (a ﬁnancial biweekly) and FD (a ﬁnancial daily),
which are widely read in the ﬁnancial community, seemed to be critical and sometimesFINANCIAL ACCOUNTING REGULATION IN THE NETHERLANDS
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even hostile to the prevailing practice of ﬁnancial conglomerate reporting. Editorial
comments on the rule development of ‘bancassurance’ reporting stressed that vitally
important companies should provide sufﬁciently detailed information in their annual
reports. In particular, the concentration of power in ﬁnancial conglomerates
concerned the ﬁnancial press. It was stated that more disclosure and better annual
reports could contribute to the insight into the affairs of ﬁnancial conglomerates. The
relatively large number of articles that appeared on the subject indicates that
considerable resources were devoted to this cause (FD, 2 May 1992, 13 November
1992; FEM, 13 June 1992; Hers, 1993a, 1993b; Keiser 1993). Moreover, the Christian
Democrats used the articles in FEM and the FD in forming an opinion on the matter.
Hence, these two users had an important inﬂuence on the resulting segmental
reporting standard. The users in the Council had similar preferences for segmental
reporting as the ﬁnancial press and the investment ﬁrm. The preferences of the users
are in line with prior ﬁndings in the literature. Users of ﬁnancial statements are found
to prefer as much disclosure of information as possible as long as it is provided freely
(Mian and Smith, 1990). With regard to the question at hand, it should be noted that
unconsolidated reports are generally more informative than consolidated ﬁnancial
statements in the sense that the information in a set of unconsolidated statements
generally allows a user to perform a ‘homemade’ consolidation, particularly if the
magnitude of the within-group contracting is reported or is small; the reverse,
however, is not true (Mian and Smith, 1990). In the course of time, it is expected that
the interdependencies between the banking and insurance part of ﬁnancial
conglomerates will grow. This will frustrate home-made consolidations by users. Then,
a consolidated report will be valuable for this interest group, in addition to segmental
information. Thus, the users’ preferences are understandable in view of this analysis.
Discussion of Field Reactions: The Companies Involved
The companies involved in this bancassurance case are relatively new in their
present form. The 1991 annual reports became the centre of attention because no
regulation had yet been implemented. Therefore, these reports were the most likely
to reﬂect the preferences of the companies involved. In the 1991 annual report of all
seven14 relevant companies, both banking and insurance activties were consolidated.
Van der Tas (1993) showed that ING and Reaal copied the proposals (model) of the
NVB/VvV workgroup for both the balance sheet and the proﬁt and loss. ING
adhered more closely to the proposal than Reaal. Table 3 reﬂects the segmental
information provided by the companies. This table supports the conclusion that
Fortis disclosed the most information.15
14 These companies are: ABN-AMRO, Aegon, Fortis, ING, Levob, Reaal and RABO (Van der Tas, 1993).
15 Fortis held a somewhat special position in this case as it was a transnational merger, being the result of
the merger between the Dutch VSB/AMEV and the Belgian AG. The choice for separate reporting of
bank and insurance activities may be attributed to the special structure of Fortis as it had two parents,
AG Group and N.V. AMEV, neither of which is a part of Fortis. Both parents have a 50 per cent interest
in Fortis, through a 50 per cent interest in AG 1824 and AMEV/VSB 1990. The AG Group participates
in AMEV/VSB 1990 through its 94 per cent subsidiary AG 1990 N.V. and the 100 per cent subsidiary of
the latter, AG 1990 (Netherlands), in which they perform their operational activities.ABACUS
20
The economics perspective on accounting method choice may be used to explain
the preparers’ preferences. Based on Mian and Smith’s (1990) ﬁndings, it is argued
that ‘interdependence’ is a major factor in explaining consolidation and disclosure
preferences. Increased interdependence strengthens the preference for consolida-
tion. Mian and Smith (1990) drew on transaction cost economics to argue that the
more ﬁrm-speciﬁc an activity, the more likely it will be performed within a depart-
ment or division and the less likely it will be subcontracted to an independent ﬁrm.
The accounting decision on consolidation will then reﬂect the ﬁrm’s choice of
organizational structure (make or buy), which, in turn, is determined by the degree
of interdependence between the parent and the subsidiary activities. The ﬁndings of
the case suggest that these predictions are substantially accurate. All seven ﬁrms
preferred consolidated reporting. And although the ﬁnancial conglomerates
disclosed substantial information, there was a clear borderline: the segmentation of
shareholder equity was strongly opposed.
According to pluralism, preparers will have greater incentives and better
prospects to lobby. In theory an agent will lobby to the point were the marginal
beneﬁts of lobbying equal the marginal costs. Preparers bear greater beneﬁts of
lobbying than users because the potential costs of regulation will generally be larger
(see also, Sutton, 1984, p. 85). Indeed, empirical evidence substantiated the theoret-
ical predictions in this case. It was primarily the preparers who lobbied. They had
intensive contacts with the Justice Ministry in the drafting phase of both laws, and
prior to that they were involved in European discussions pertaining to the two
directives. Likewise, they also contacted the Christian Democratic Party presumably
in an attempt to convince its representatives of their point of view.
TABLE 3
SEPARATE REPORTING BY FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES IN 1991
Segmentation Balance sheet Proﬁt and Loss statement
ING investments in nominal values consolidated result per activity
Reaal investments, placings, and loans consolidated result per activity except
other gains and losses
Fortis separate consolidated statements 
for insurance, banking and general 
activities
separate consolidated statements for
insurance, banking, and general
activities
Levob separation of equity in ﬁnancial services,
other activities, and insurance
no separate reporting
Aegon no separate reporting amount and composition of turnover
and earnings before interest and taxes
of non-insurance activities
ABN-AMRO no separate reporting no separate reporting
RABO segmentation of all relevant 
items in both activities
segmentation of all relevant items in
both activities
Source: Annual Reports and Van der Tas (1993).FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING REGULATION IN THE NETHERLANDS
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A large agent’s expected total beneﬁts are more likely to exceed lobbying costs than
a small agent’s. Thus, large agents can be expected to lobby most ardently (Ohlson,
1965). The group of companies involved in the ﬁnancial conglomerate case was not of
homogeneous size. ING was by far the most important mixed ﬁnancial ﬁrm. Fortis
was likewise of considerable importance. Indeed, ING appeared to be the most active
lobbying party. Even Fortis did not seem to play as important a part as ING, although
it was certainly involved, for example, in its contacts with the Justice Ministry and in
the preparation of the NVB/VvV advice. The contacts with the Justice Ministry were,
however, the result of initiatives on the side of the ministry itself. Therefore, the
prediction is corroborated to the extent that only very large companies with
signiﬁcant interests in the regulatory process would attempt individually to inﬂuence
the outcome. An important part of the lobbying was performed collectively by the
joint initiative of the two industry associations involved, the NVB and VvV. It should
be noted that since accounting regulation exhibits the characteristics of a public good,
no agent can be excluded from its beneﬁts after implementation. Therefore, little
incentive exists to contribute to the costs of lobbying. Unless a cost-sharing rule is
agreed upon, free riding is likely to occur. Industry associations are then likely candi-
dates to represent the views of preparers of ﬁnancial statements. In contrast to ad hoc
lobby groups, industry associations have established cost-sharing rules, and other
measures for facilitating effective collective action. Moreover, they do not encounter
start-up costs which ensue from initiating an organization which uniﬁes agents with
similar interests. The joint NVB/VvV workgroup was supplied secretarial support by
NVB. Moreover, the workgroup was formed by members of both industry associa-
tions. As such, this workgroup participated intensively in the process at relatively low
costs.
Some companies appeared to dominate the collective actions, although all of the
important companies provided some input. When intensities of preferences over a
certain item differ between members of a lobbying group, log-rolling may occur, that is,
the agent who feels the strongest on an issue will be supported by other agents (with
marginal interests) on the condition that such a support be reciprocated in due time.
Lobbying seemed to be aimed at the Council on Annual Reporting. In the workgroup
formed by this Council, there was support for ING’s position. Subsequently, the
representatives of the employers’ organizations readily supported ING’s position in
deliberations on the ﬂoor of the Council. Comparing the 1991 annual reports of the
ﬁnancial conglomerates with the NVB/VvV proposal, it appeared that ING’s annual
report was the most in line with this proposal. Therefore, and in light of the results of
the interviews, it seems reasonable to suggest that log-rolling took place in favour of
ING’s preferences when drafting the NVB/VvV advice, and in the employers’
delegation of the Council. The conclusion seems all the more legitimate because Fortis,
the other major player in the ﬁeld, had a completely different disclosure preference.
One of the respondents pointed out that it was unlikely that captains of industry
would participate in demonstrations.16 Indeed, most lobbying occurred through some
16 In the recent intense controversy in the U.S.A. over recognizing the compensation expense implicit
in stock option plans, however, companies that objected to the FASB’s proposal hired a band and
demonstrated loudly outside the FASB’s hearing room.ABACUS
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form of information transfer. It is interesting to note that the government itself
explicitly solicited the transfer of information (e.g., NVB/VvV advice). Not only did
the industry transfer information by publishing an advisory statement, it also
participated in the exchange of views while the new legislation was being debated.
The lobby method of information transfer from agents to the standard-setter, and
especially subsidizing ‘independent’ or ‘expert’ information that supports the
position of an agent, has long been recognized in the literature (Bartlett, 1973; Watts
and Zimmerman, 1979). Information transfer is not the only way agents put their
views on the stage. Private conversations and informal meetings with members of
parliament, and representatives of government (politicans as well as civil servants)
are among the most effective lobbying instruments, and were used by the producers
of ﬁnancial accounts.
With regard to the timing of the lobbying, the prediction is that effective lobbying
would occur as early in the process as possible. Lobbying is likely to be most
successful if it takes place before a civil servant sets pencil to paper for the ﬁrst time
to write a proposal. Once a certain regulation is enacted, the possibilities of changing
its implications are limited (Sutton, 1984; Van Schendelen, 1988). One of the most
successful lobbying efforts was undertaken by the large investment ﬁrm which
contacted the Christian Democrats Party at an early stage of the process. Although
industry representatives engaged in talks with the Justice Ministry regarding the
draft laws, the most intense lobbying occurred relatively late in the process, when
ING’s ﬁnancial ofﬁcer talked to the Christian Democrats’ spokesman in April 1993.
Apparently, the Christian Democrats had already made up their mind on this issue
and the efforts of industry proved to be futile.
Discussion of Field Reactions: Auditor Involvement
The market for audit services for ﬁnancial conglomerates is characterized by a
duopoly. The market is almost completely dominated by two audit ﬁrms: Moret,
Ernst & Young (MEY) and KPMG. There are only a few contemporary statements
of the opinion of auditors regarding the ﬁnancial conglomerates issue. One of the
most interesting was made by the MEY vice-chairman of the board while presenting
the MEY annual report 1991. He declared that it was the opinion of MEY that
separate reporting should be required for those ﬁnancial conglomerates which had
equally large banking and insurance activities (FD, 25 March 1992). This opinion
diametrically opposed the interests of  MEY’s (large) clients, who were only willing
to implement separate reporting to a limited degree. Moreover, it should be noted
that the vice-chairman’s ideas conﬂicted with the proposals made by NVB/VvV. The
vice-chairman made his statement after the joint NVB/VvV advice was published,
but before parliament discussed the draft law. Although remarkable, this statement
did not seem to have had an important impact on the political process, as the
Christian Democrats Party was unaware of it. However, the Justice Ministry was
somewhat disconcerted that one of the largest auditing ﬁrms in the country appeared
to be taking a position which clearly diverged from the Ministry’s policy. Hence,
MEY was contacted by the Justice Ministry to ﬁnd out whether this was indeed an
ofﬁcial position taken by the ﬁrm regarding this issue. MEY made it clear that thereFINANCIAL ACCOUNTING REGULATION IN THE NETHERLANDS
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was no such position and that the vice-chairman’s statement reﬂected only his
personal views (interview with Ms Wortmann). One of the large clients of MEY was
ING. The ING assignment partner at MEY held quite a different opinion on the
issue than his vice-chairman; he supported the idea that ING should present itself as
a single indivisible unit. ING’s top ﬁnancial ofﬁcer was rather annoyed with the
statements by MEY’s vice-chairman (interview with Mr Badon Ghijben). In an
attempt to convince ING of their good intentions, MEY ofﬁcials referred to their
vice-chairman’s comments as ‘an internal communications error’.
With regard to the position of auditors, the literature suggests that they face a
number of incentives, which are not mutually exclusive. Watts and Zimmerman
(1986) argued that audit ﬁrms have incentives to lobby for standards that increase
their value; an increase in value will be expected if audit fees rise due to increased
audit services which originate, for example, in the examination of previously
separated reported activities. Consequently, auditors will favour consolidation.
Furthermore, when separate statements on activities have to be provided to prevent
information loss, additional audit services can be expected, and auditors can be
expected to favour separate statements. Auditors have, in addition, an incentive to
support their clients’ positions (Haring, 1979; Puro, 1984, 1985). Puro showed that,
although in lobbying the FASB audit ﬁrms did not support their clients in disclosure
matters, they did support their client’s position on measurement issues. In this case, it
is then expected that auditors and their clients will disagree on the disclosure of
segmental information. The prediction is that auditors will lobby for segmental
reports while preparers are expected to lobby against it. The empirical ﬁndings in
this case suggest that auditors did support their clients, even in disclosure matters.
Thus, Puro’s (1985) ﬁndings were not corroborated, but evidence was found in
support of Watts and Zimmerman (1986) ‘audit fee hypothesis’. The pluralist notion
that only large audit ﬁrms will be involved in lobbying the standard-setter was also
corroborated. Indeed, only Big-6 ﬁrms (KPMG; Moret, Ernst & Young; Touche
Ross) played a part in the political process.
CONCLUSION
Pluralism states that the agent that commits the most resources to lobbying is more
likely to see his preferences reﬂected in the standard (Becker, 1983). The standard
that was implemented by parliament (Article 406) mirrored mostly the preferences of
users, that is, consolidation of both bank and insurance activities, and substantial
segmental information including information about the allocation of shareholder
equity. Although prior beliefs might indicate that preparers, as the most wealthy
party, would have the most inﬂuence, the ﬁnancial conglomerate case showed that the
combined lobby efforts (resource dedication) of users were substantial. Especially, the
input of a large investment ﬁrm and the ﬁnancial press played an important role. The
regulatory effort was the result of a ‘crisis’, namely, the unanticipated merger of banks
and insurance ﬁrms. The analysis showed that there were several interested parties in
the forging of Article 406. From the outline of their preferences it can be implied that
the producers of accounts were not a cohesive block. However, they lobbied for aABACUS
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standard that accommodated each of their views. Auditors did adhere closely to the
preferences of the companies to which they were afﬁliated. In contrast to some earlier
ﬁndings (Puro, 1985; Rahman et al., 1994), producers and auditors clustered when
presenting their views. Users and the Dutch Central Bank opposed the producers and
auditors with regard to their disclosure preferences. Government was involved in the
process, mainly through two ‘agencies’: parliament and the Justice Ministry. The
interested parties differed in the opportunities they had to participate in the formal
promulgation process. Moreover, they differed in the degree they had access to
decision makers at key governmental positions. Preparers and the Dutch Central
Bank, for example, had ample opportunities to engage in the preparatory phase of the
regulation process because they were involved with the EC discussions on the
banking and insurance directive, and because the Justice Ministry sought to
incorporate the preparers’ views in the draft law and, therefore, asked for contribu-
tions to the process. The preparers and the large investment ﬁrm also had direct
access to the Christian Democrats Party. Other users were conﬁned to indirect means
like newspapers to convey their views. Although companies, in general, seem to have
institutionalized their involvement in accounting standard setting, and thus might be
better capable to present their views, in line with the pluralist tenet, other interested
parties were able to effectively voice their opinion in the process and have some
inﬂuence in the political process.
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